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Wynne: Setting a Single Form of Bail

MCMANUS V. HORN: THE LEGALITY OF SETTING A SINGLE
FORM OF BAIL
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK
People ex rel. McManus v. Horn1
(decided March 22, 2012)
I.

INTRODUCTION

In March 2012, the New York Court of Appeals came down
with a decision that clarified the options given to a court in setting
bail.2 The case, People ex rel. McManus v. Horn, was an appeal for
the court to consider whether New York Criminal Procedure Law
(“CPL”) section 520.10(2)(b) “prohibits a court from designating only one form of bail.”3 Both McManus and the District Attorney relied on the language of the statute to argue their opposing points.4
McManus argued that a single form of bail is illegal under the New
York law, while the government argued that the law allows a judge to
designate a single form of bail.5 This stark difference in statutory interpretation required the court provide some clarification.
In a 2007 case, the court stated that its “primary goal is to interpret a statute by determining, and implementing, the Legislature’s
intent.”6 This analysis begins with looking to the language chosen by
the legislature in drafting the statute.7 Then, the court should look to
the “purposes underlying the legislative scheme,” or in other words,
legislative intent.8 The entire analysis should be conducted with historical considerations in mind.9 While the surrounding circumstances
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

18 N.Y.3d 660 (2012).
Id. at 666.
Id. at 662.
Id. at 664-65.
Id. at 664.
People v. Litto, 8 N.Y.3d 692, 697 (2007).
Id. at 697.
Id.
N.Y. STAT. LAW §124 (McKinney 2012).
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will not control the plain, unambiguous text of the statute, it cannot
simply be ignored.10 Additionally, the textual discussion should be
followed by review of the litigation on the statute.11
This Note on the recent Court of Appeals’ holding in
McManus will examine how the court came to hold that New York
law prohibits a court from fixing only one form of bail. 12 Statutory
language and legislative intent, considered in light of the extensive
history of bail reform, help clarify how the court arrived at the conclusion it did. This analysis will be followed by a review of the division between several other states on the issue of allowing their courts
to set a solitary form of bail. Finally, a review of the implications of
this decision, or lack thereof, will be discussed.
II.

MCMANUS V. HORN

“Petitioner Shaun McManus was on parole . . . when he was
arrested for arson . . . and related offenses stemming from two separate incidents” against a common victim.13 McManus was accused of
assaulting an individual and setting the same individual’s two cars on
fire.14 “Bail was set at $5,000, cash or bond, . . . [and t]he victim was
granted a temporary order of protection.”15 McManus posted bail,
but subsequently violated the order of protection by verbally abusing
the victim and threatening him with weapons.16 He was arraigned on
new charges and bail was set at $1500, cash or bond, for each offense, but he was not released on bail because the Division of Parole
filed a violation warrant with the Department of Corrections.17 Based
on the original incidents of arson and assault, McManus was indicted
for two counts of arson, four counts of aggravated harassment, two
counts of criminal mischief, and one count of assault.18 The “Supreme Court ordered that bail be set at $20,000, ‘CASH ONLY.’ ”19
“When the Division of Parole [withdrew] its hold on [peti10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

Id.
U.S. v. Alvarez-Hernandez, 478 F.3d 1060, 1065-66 (2007).
McManus, 18 N.Y.3d at 666.
Id. at 662.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 663.
McManus, 18 N.Y.3d at 663.
Id.
Id.
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tioner], he tried to secure a bail bond but was” unsuccessful due to
the fact that the court required bail be in the form of cash only.20
McManus sought an alteration of his bail ruling, arguing that setting a
single form of bail is not allowed under CPL section 520.10(2)(b),
but the Supreme Court stuck to its bail determination.21 Petitioner
then initiated a proceeding for a writ of habeas corpus. 22 The Supreme Court held that CPL 520.10(2)(b) does not preclude a judge
from setting a single form of bail and the Appellate Division affirmed
on the same grounds.23
Before the Court of Appeals analyzed the merits of the case, it
had to decide if the issue became moot when McManus entered a
guilty plea to the arson and as to other charges.24 Petitioner’s pretrial detention was terminated upon this plea, so the legality of the detention was technically a non-issue.25 However, the court found that
a mootness exception applied because the issue of cash-only bail is
important, likely to reoccur, and will typically evade review. 26 As
such, the case was not dismissed on mootness grounds, and the court
proceeded with its interpretation of the statute.27
The court first turned to the language used in the statute at issue.28 In the first section of the statute, nine categories of bail are
permitted.29 The second section of the statute “specifies two distinct
‘methods of fixing bail.’ ”30 The first method allows the court to designate the monetary amount of bail without specifying the form in
which it may be posted.31 If this option is employed, the accused can
post the amount in any of the nine forms listed in the first section of
the statute.32 The second method of fixing bail states that a “court
may direct that the bail be posted in any one of two or more of the
forms specified in subdivision one, designated in the alternative, and
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

Id.
Id.
McManus, 18 N.Y.3d at 663.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 663-64.
McManus, 18 N.Y.3d at 664.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 520.10(2)(b) (McKinney 2012)).
Id.
McManus, 18 N.Y.3d at 664.
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may designate different amounts varying with the forms.”33
McManus argued that a single form of bail, such as cash-only
bail, is illegal under the statute because subdivision (2)(b) “requires
that at least two forms of bail be” set.34 He relied on the language,
“any one of two or more of the forms” to support his contentions.35
The government countered by arguing that a single form of bail is
permissible under CPL 520.10 because (2)(a) uses the word “form”
not “forms,” and the word “may” and not “must” is used in both (a)
and (b) of subdivision (2).36 The court conceded that both parties’
arguments had “some degree of linguistic merit,” and thus a legislative intent analysis would help decide which argument should prevail.37 It held that McManus’ argument better conformed with the
“overall statutory structure and legislative purpose” that impelled the
enactment of the statute in question.38
The word “may” was employed to categorize the two permissible methods of fixing bail in subdivision (2).39 “The Legislature
could not have used the word ‘must’ ” because that would have limited the court’s discretion in choosing between the two enumerated
options.40 It was the intention of the legislature “to reform the restrictive bail scheme that existed [prior to the current statute] in order to
improve the availability of pre-trial release.”41 In order to improve
such availability, the legislature provided flexible bail alternatives to
presumptively innocent pretrial detainees.42
The court ended its decision by stating that the other forms of
bail that must be set imposed no undue restriction on a court because
the two forms of bail may be virtually indistinguishable from one another.43 The court subsequently provided examples of how the court
could have determined proper bail for McManus in conformity of
CPL section 520.10.44 Along with the $20,000 cash option, the judge
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44

Id. (quoting N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 520.10(2)(b)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
McManus, 18 N.Y.3d at 665.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citations omitted).
McManus, 18 N.Y.3d at 665.
Id. at 665-66.
Id. at 666.
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could have ordered a $200,000 partially secured appearance bond requiring a monetary deposit of 10%, or a $20,000 secured appearance
bond that could be satisfied with, among other things, $20,000 in
cash.45 Therefore, the court concluded that there was no compelling
reason for the legislature to allow a single form of bail in the statute.46 The judgment was reversed and the proceeding was converted
to declaratory judgment declaring that CPL 520.10(2)(b) prohibits the
designation of one form of bail.47
III.

STATUTORY ANALYSIS OF CPL 520.10

In its decision on McManus’ writ of habeas corpus, the Bronx
County Supreme Court pointed out that “[t]here are no reported cases
holding either that a court must set two forms of bail, or that setting
one form is permissible.”48 However, it did acknowledge that in
People v. Imran,49 the court stated that CPL 520.10(2)(b) allows a
court to “delimit the options [for posting bail] by specifying at least
two forms of bail.”50 Because the issue in Imran was whether a real
estate bond posted by the defendant had to satisfy the double equity
requirement for a secured bond set out in CPL 500.10(17)(b), and not
whether two forms of bail is required under CPL 520.10(b)(2), the
statement of the court is simply dicta.51 In order to discern whether
the Court of Appeals was justified in overturning the lower court’s
interpretation of the statute, an analysis of the history, language used,
and legislative intent is necessary.

A.

Text of CPL section 520.10(2)

New York Criminal Procedure Law section 520.10(2) reads:
2. The methods of fixing bail are as follows:
(a) A court may designate the amount of the bail without designating the form or forms in which it may be
45

Id.
Id.
47
McManus, 18 N.Y.3d at 666.
48
People ex rel. Meis v. Horn, 888 N.Y.S.2d 392 (2009).
49
People v. Iman, 754 N.Y.S.2d 159 (2002).
50
Horn, 888 N.Y.S.2d at 394 (quoting Imran, 888 N.Y.S.2d at 161) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (alteration in original).
51
Id.
46
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posted. In such case, the bail may be posted in either
of the forms specified in paragraphs (g) and (h) of
subdivision one;
(b) The court may direct that the bail be posted in any
one of two or more of the forms specified in subdivision one, designated in the alternative, and may designate different amounts varying with the forms[.]52
This language has been read in two very distinct ways. 53 The
decisions of the three courts that ruled on the McManus case exemplify the distinction.54
The difference of opinion starts with the interpretation of the
introductory text of subdivision two.55 One way of reading “[t]he
methods of fixing bail are as follows[]” is that the two subdivisions
that follow are the only options available to a court in setting bail.56
Another way of reading the text is that the court can set bail in the
two methods described in the subdivisions, but taking into account
the permissive language used in those subdivisions, they are not the
only ways bail may be set.57 The proponents of this latter view propose that if the legislature intended the subdivisions to be the only
means of setting bail, they would have used language such as “when
fixing bail, a court must do so” in either manner set out in subdivision
(a) or (b), or alternatively, “the only methods of fixing bail permitted
are” those in the following subdivisions.58 However, the Court of
Appeals held that “inclusion of the word ‘may’ in both subdivisions
was the simplest way for the legislature to codify the two permissible
methods for fixing bail[.]”59 If the legislature had chosen to use the
word “must” instead of “may,” the statute would have eliminated the
discretion given to the court, which it did not want to do.60
Subdivision (a) includes the words “form or forms,” suggest52

N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 520.10(2).
Compare McManus, 18 N.Y.3d 660, with Horn, 888 N.Y.S.2d 392. In McManus, the
Court of Appeals found the statute required the court to set a minimum of two forms of bail
while in Horn, the Supreme Court, Bronx County, found that the statute permitted the court
to set one form of bail if it so choses.
54
Id.
55
Horn, 888 N.Y.S.2d at 394.
56
Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 520.10(2)).
57
Id.
58
Id. at 395 (internal quotation marks omitted).
59
McManus, 18 N.Y.3d at 665.
60
Id.
53
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ing that it is permissible for a court to designate a single form.61 This
language can also be read as allowing the court to designate a single
amount of bail, but not a single form of bail attached to that single
amount.62
The opposing views of the nature of the text underlie these interpretations of the language chosen by the legislature. If the language is taken as being permissive, a single form and amount of bail
may be set, but conversely if the language is read as being restrictive
of the discretion of the court, a single form of bail is precluded.
Thus, the plain language is not definitive enough for an analysis to
rest upon. As the Court of Appeals stated over a decade ago, “Where
the language of a statute is susceptible of two constructions, the
courts will adopt that which avoids injustice, hardship, constitutional
doubts or other objectionable results.”63 In order to distinguish which
view would avoid injustice, the text of the statute must be interpreted
in light of conditions existing at the time of its enactment so as to decipher the intentions of the legislature in using the words chosen.64
B.

Historical Perspective

The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution demands that excessive bail not be ordered.65 However, nowhere in the
Constitution is there a specified right to bail.66
The English law concerning bail undoubtedly influenced the
drafters of the Constitution.67 The Petition of Right predetermined
which crimes were bailable and which crimes were not. 68 This statute took away from the sheriffs the discretion, which was often
abused, of determining in which situations to set bail.69 With no penalty for the violation of the statute in place, discriminatory practices

61

Id.
Id.
63
In re Jacob, 86 N.Y.2d 651, 667 (1995) (quoting Kauffman & Sons Saddlery Co. v.
Miller Harness Co., 80 N.E.2d 322, 325 (N.Y. 1948)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
64
Litto, 8 N.Y.S.2d at 697.
65
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
66
Caleb Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail: I, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 959, 968
(1965).
67
Id.
68
Id. at 967.
69
Id.
62
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continued.70 In response, the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 provided
the procedures for proceedings that would hold violators subject to
penalties.71 The principles of the Act influenced Article I, section 9
of the Constitution, which sets forth the principle of habeas corpus.72
A decade later, the English Bill of Rights set a prohibition against excessive bail.73 The language used in this bill of rights can be seen today in the Eighth Amendment.74 However, notably missing is the influence of the Petition of Right.75
Bail rights developed entirely separately from English influence as well. One such influence was the development of the Judiciary Act of 1789, enacted by the first Congress.76 The Act specified
that all non-capital offenses are bailable, but bail determinations for
capital offenses are left to the discretion of the presiding judge.77
Congress later enacted the Bail Reform Act of 1966 that grants a
statutory right to non-capital defendants of pretrial release on their
own recognizance or personal bond.78 However, if there is a determination that these measures will not assure appearance at trial, alternative conditions such as travel constraints may be placed on the
defendant.79 A highly controversial part of the act was that a judge
was not allowed to consider the accused’s danger to society in noncapital cases; only flight risk could be considered.80 This changed in
1984 when Congress replaced the Bail Reform Act of 1966 with
United States Code, title 18, sections 3141-3150, allowing courts to
detain pretrial defendants if it is determined they pose a danger to the
community through clear and convincing evidence.81 The United
States Code did not do away with the Bail Reform Act’s attempt “to
de-emphasize the use of monetary bail and to encourage judges to
consider nonmonetary release conditions.”82
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82

Id.
Foote, supra note 66, at 967.
Id. at 968.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Foote, supra note 66, at 971.
Kenneth Frederick Berg, The Bail Reform Act of 1984, 34 EMORY L.J. 685, 687 (1985).
U.S. v. Leathers, 412 F.2d 169, 170 (1969).
Id. at 170-71.
Id. at 171.
Ray Del Castillo & Gihan Fernando, Bail, 77 GEO. L.J. 786, 787-88 (1989).
State v. Brooks, 604 N.W.2d 345, 350 (Minn. 2000).
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The Constitution of New York State codified its own law
against excessive bail in article I, section 5,83 but just as the Federal
Constitution grants no affirmative right to bail, the state constitution
does not either.84 Criminal Procedure Law section 510.30(2) requires
a court to consider aspects such as the individual’s character, reputation, employment, financial resources, criminal record, residency,
weight of evidence against him, and possible sentence upon conviction, when determining bail.85 The law also provides that if the offense charged is a misdemeanor, bail must be set, but if the offense is
a felony, the court has the discretion of choosing between setting bail
or detaining the individual after the district attorney is notified and
the court has reviewed the criminal record of the individual.86 However, if the felony is a class A felony or the individual has two prior
felony convictions, bail is not permitted.87
When a change to the language of a statute is made, a change
in the law is presumed.88 Due to confusion and inadequate awareness
of the proper scheme in setting bail, the state legislature enacted CPL
Article 500 in 1971.89 The provisions discussed above, the one at issue in the McManus case, and several others were codified through
this legislation.90 There have been two modifications of section
520.10 subsequent to the 1971 enactment. When first enacted, section 520.10(2)(a) was read to limit the defendant’s selection of the
form of bail he or she wished to post when the court failed to specify
itself.91 The defendant could only select the forms in paragraphs (a)
through (d) of subdivision one, which were the most burdening
forms.92 In 1972, the legislature amended subsection (2)(a) by replacing the choice between the forms stipulated in (a), (b), (c), or (d)
to the choice of either form (g) or (h).93 Then in 1986, the legislature
added the option of posting bail through “credit card or similar de83

People ex rel. Shapiro v. Keeper of City Prison, 49 N.E.2d 498, 500 (N.Y. 1943).
Id.
85
People ex rel. Klein v. Krueger, 255 N.E.2d 552, 555 (1969).
86
Id. at 554.
87
Id.
88
N.Y. STAT. LAW §124.
89
Robert Webster Oliver, Bail and the Concept of Preventative Detention, 69-Oct. N.Y.
ST. B.J. 8, 9 (1997).
90
Peter Preiser, Practice Commentaries, N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 520.10.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Id.
84
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vice” as the ninth authorized form of bail.94
C.

Legislative Intent

In light of the plain language as well as historical and legislative development of bail schemes both in the country and in New
York State, the legislative intent behind the statutes can begin to be
construed. It was recognized that the Bail Reform Act of 1966 “was
an effort by Congress to give meaning to some of our highest ideals
of injustice. It was, by common consent, a legislative intervention in
a field where reform was badly needed.”95 One of the highest ideals
of injustice Congress was concerned with was the idea that the accused are considered innocent until proven guilty.96 If this is to be
true, imprisoning the accused before trial may be hard to justify.
The 1972 amendment to CPL 520.10 relaxed the restrictions
on the forms of bail that could be posted.97 The legislature adopted
this amendment in order to “provide a method of release somewhere
between bail . . . and release on one’s own recognizance.”98 The legislature was hoping to reduce the number of imprisoned individuals
who are not convicted.99 The Mayor of New York, John V. Lindsay,
wrote to the Governor, Nelson A. Rockefeller, urging him to approve
the amendment.100 Lindsay believed the amendment would create a
presumption in favor of pretrial release and reduce the role of
bondsmen, thus making it possible for more defendants to obtain pretrial release.101 Through adopting the amendments, it can be viewed
as the legislature intending to provide more feasible opportunities to
the accused in meeting their bail requirements and obtaining pretrial
release.102 This in turn would help the government with the problem
of overcrowded prisons and large caseloads.103

94

Id.
Leathers, 412 F.2d at 170.
96
McManus, 18 N.Y.3d at 665.
97
Bellamy v. Judges in N.Y. City Crim. Ct., 41 A.D.2d 196, 202 (1973).
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Letter from John V. Lindsay, Mayor of New York, to Nelson A. Rockefeller, Governor
of the State of New York (May 24, 1972).
101
Id.
102
Bellamy, 41 A.D.2d at 202.
103
Letter from John H. Hughes, Chairman, Committee on Judiciary, to Michael
Whiteman, Executive Chamber (May 18, 1972).
95

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol29/iss4/27

10

Wynne: Setting a Single Form of Bail

2013]

SETTING A SINGLE FORM OF BAIL

1547

The second revision in 1986 added section 520.10(1)(i),
which is the ninth form of authorized bail forms.104 The provision allowed the use of credit cards for bail payments. 105 However, a year
later it was amended to apply only in vehicular and traffic law violations.106 This restriction remained in place until 2005, when it was
removed from the statute.107 Presently, the ninth form of bail, the use
of credit cards, is authorized for any violation, not just traffic and vehicular offenses.108 It should also be noted that CPL section 520.15
grants the defendant the option of posting cash bail, even when the
form of cash was not specified as acceptable when bail was set.109
The removal of restrictions on forms of bail, the additions of
more forms of bail, including less onerous forms of bail, and the separate legislation always permitting cash bail tend to show that the legislature intended to grant the accused as many feasible opportunities
as possible to meet bail. If the legislature was truly unconcerned
about the accused getting adequate and feasible opportunities of posting bail, it would not have continued to enact legislation in three out
of the past four decades.110
IV.

OTHER JURISDICTIONS’ HOLDINGS ON CASH-ONLY BAIL

In 2002, a criminal court in Kings County held that CPL section 520.10(1) gives the court many bail options, and the court may
“delimit the options by specifying at least two forms of bail.”111 Also, in a Commission on Judicial Conduct in 2004, the committee
found that a town judge committed misconduct, among other things,
by sending a defendant to jail for two weeks because he could not
meet the set bail of $500 cash.112 The commission declared that the
“Criminal Procedure Law requires that bail be set in more than one
form.”113 Other than these few comments on the permissibility of
cash-only, there have been few decisions on the permissibility of
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113

Preiser, supra note 90.
Id.
Id.
Id.
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 520.10(1)(i).
Id. at § 520.15.
Id. at § 520.10.
Imran, 754 N.Y.S.2d at 160.
N.Y. Comm’n Jud. Cond., 2004 WL 2213862, at *3.
Id.
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courts to set cash-only bail. Therefore, it is useful to look to other
states and see how they have dealt with the issue. While each state
has the freedom to enact their own statutory scheme of setting bail,
the whole country adheres to the fundamental concept that individuals are innocent until proven guilty.114 As such, the different interpretations of the fundamental fairness and legality of cash-only bail setting in other states is meaningful to New York State.
A.

States that Found Cash-Only Bail Permissible

Arizona,115 Alabama,116 and Iowa117 have held that cash only
bail is permissible. Iowa was the first of these states to determine the
legality of the single form bail determination in the 2003 case of State
v. Briggs.118 The court followed the same statutory interpretation
method as the court in McManus did by looking to the language used
in light of historical background and legislative intent.119 However,
the Iowa statute is broader than New York’s, only guaranteeing the
accused the right to “sufficient sureties” and non-excessive bail.120
The court held that the purpose of the “sufficient sureties” clause was
to “guarantee a bailable individual access to a surety of some
form”121 and not necessarily any form.122 It was conceded that it was
conceivable for cash-only bail to violate the clause prohibiting excessive bail, but because the defendant had been charged with the same
offense four times in one year and previously failed to show up for
court, the imposition of cash-only bail was found to be non-excessive
in reasonably assuring the defendant’s presence at trial.123 The dissent was very concerned that if the judges were given the discretion
to set a single form of bail, they could in effect detain the accused.124
If a defendant has no real estate and the judge can require putting up
real estate to secure release, the effect is a denial of sufficient sure114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124

Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976).
Fragoso v. Fell, 210 Ariz. 427, 429 (2005).
Ex parte Singleton, 902 So.2d 132, 134 (Ala. 2004).
State v. Briggs, 666 N.W.2d 573, 574 (Iowa 2003).
Id.
Id. at 578.
Id. at 577.
Id. at 581.
Briggs, 666 N.W.2d at 582.
Id. at 584.
Id. at 586.
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ties.125 The same can be said for cash-only bail determinations when
the defendant has no cash.126
Two years later, the Arizona Court of Appeals in Fragoso v.
Fell127 interpreted its own “sufficient sureties” clause in the same way
as the Iowa court did in Briggs.128 The court held that the term “sufficient” gives the judge discretion to impose conditions necessary to
ensure the defendant’s appearance at trial.129 However, the court
concluded with a cautionary statement emphasizing that “nothing in
this decision should be interpreted as blanket authority for cash-only
bail.”130 The judge is still under the obligation to set the least burdensome condition that will reasonably guarantee the accused’s presence
at trial.131
The Alabama Court of Appeals in Ex parte Harold Single132
ton relied heavily on the Briggs decision when it decided that “sufficient sureties” allowed a judge to set cash-only bail.133 In fact, the
court quoted the Briggs decision in almost all of its discussion on
why it cannot hold that the Alabama Constitution prohibits a judge
from setting cash-only bail.134 It held that it had the same views as
the Iowa court on the discretion that should be given to the judges.135
B.

States that have Found Cash-Only Bail
Impermissible

Montana,136 Ohio,137 Tennessee,138 Minnesota,139 and Vermont have all held that courts cannot set cash-only bail. The way
140

125

Id.
Id.
127
210 Ariz. 427 (2005).
128
Id. at 432.
129
Id. at 433.
130
Id. at 434.
131
Id.
132
902 So.2d 132 (Ala. 2004).
133
Id. at 135.
134
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in which some of these courts interpret the historical background and
intention of setting pretrial bail differs from the courts in Iowa, Arizona and Alabama.141 This difference in interpretation lead to different conclusions on the permissibility of cash-only bail.
In State v. Hance,142 the Vermont court looked to the history
of “sufficient sureties” and concluded that the clause’s primary purpose is to protect the liberty interest of the accused while also serving
the court’s interest in securing the appearance of the individual at trial.143 The inclusion of the accused’s interest in pretrial liberty is
markedly absent from the Arizona court’s interpretation of the purpose of bail in Fragroso.144 When considering the interests of the accused and the interests of the government, the court found that the
distinction between cash-only bail and a secured appearance bond only affects the accused’s interests, and not the government’s, because
both forms of bail serve the court’s interest in securing the accused’s
appearance.145 In Hance, the court also had a similar argument as
that of the dissent in Briggs, stating, “permitting cash-only bail would
increase government power to engage in pre-trial confinement.”146
That argument proved relevant again in the Tennessee court’s opinion of Lewis Bail Bond Company v. General Sessions Court of Madison County147 and the Minnesota court’s opinion in State v. Brooks.148
The Supreme Court of Ohio in State ex. Rel. Jones v. Hen149
don also took up the issue of state and individual interests in setting
cash-only bail.150 The court held that because the judge has the discretion to impose conditions on a bond, there is no legitimate purpose
for designating the form in which it may be posted.151 It went on to
conclude that “the only apparent purpose in requiring a ‘cash-only’
bond to the exclusion of other forms . . . is to restrict the accused’s
access to surety, and thus, to detain the accused” which would be a
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66 Ohio St.3d 115.
Id. at 117-18.
Id. at 118.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol29/iss4/27

14

Wynne: Setting a Single Form of Bail

2013]

SETTING A SINGLE FORM OF BAIL

1551

violation of state law.152 This conclusion that the only interest in setting cash-only bail is an unlawful one left the legislature to clarify the
discretion of judges in setting bail.
In 1998, the Ohio legislature amended the state’s constitution,
making two major changes.153 First, the amendment allowed the
court to deny bail to an individual charged with a felony where there
is great proof or assumption of guilt and the individual poses a serious risk of harm to the community.154 Second, the amendment allowed the court to determine “at any time the type, amount, and conditions of bail” when an individual is charged with an offense they
can be imprisoned for.155 The Supreme Court of Ohio in Smith v.
Leis156 found that the amendment did not change the determination
that cash-only bail is impermissible.157 While the amendment did expand the court’s discretion in denying bail in certain circumstances, it
did not limit the forms of bail an individual can post when bail is
granted.158
The court in McManus used much of the same logic as the
Ohio court did in Hendon.159 The existence of other alternative
methods of ensuring the accused’s presence at trial leads to the conclusion that the only interest being affected by a decision to not allow
single-form bail setting is the accused’s interest in pretrial liberty.160
When conducting an analysis and making a determination on the interpretation of a law it is important for courts to consider the effect
their decision will have on the government, individuals and society as
a whole.
V.

EFFECT OF MCMANUS

The pretrial stage of litigation has been recognized by the Supreme Court as the “most critical period” for the accused.161 The
ability of a defendant to prepare for his or her defense is very differ152
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ent if they are detained rather than free. Thus, it seems that the
McManus decision will have the most notable effect on defendants
who are unable to post bail and must remain incarcerated until their
trial due to a lack of financial means.
Defendants will now have the option of posting bail in a minimum of two forms. If the judge declares a monetary amount for bail
but does not specify a form, the defendant may choose to post that
amount through an unsecured surety bond, an unsecured appearance
bond, or cash.162 If the judge chooses to specify the form and amount
of bail, he or she must do so by designating two alternative forms;163
a judge may no longer specify one amount and one form. 164 The
court believes the options given to the defendant in choosing the form
to post will help further the legislature’s intent of improving the
availability of pretrial release.165 However, the prohibition on singleform bond determinations may not improve a defendant’s ability to
obtain pretrial release as much as the court hopes because the two
forms of bail may be equally unattainable.
The McManus decision makes it clear that if a court decides
that $20,000 cash bail is what it will take to secure the defendant’s
presence at trial, it may set bail in accordance with §520.10(2)(b) by
requiring either $20,000 cash or in the alternative a $200,000 partially secured appearance bond requiring a monetary deposit of 10%,
which equates to $20,000.166 Thus, if a defendant does not have
$20,000 in cash, he or she will not be able to post either of the alternative forms. Allowing courts to set such “virtually indistinguishable” forms of bail, it can hardly be seen as serving the underlying
purpose of section 520, which is “providing flexible bail alternatives
to pretrial detainees—who are presumptively innocent until proven
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”167
The inability to provide sufficient collateral to secure a bail
bond is just one of the problems a defendant may face when trying to
secure pretrial release.168 Another problem will occur when bail is set
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low.169 A bondsperson will profit “approximately $345 on a $5,000
bond, $150 on a $2,000 bond, and $75 on a $1,000 bond.”170 While
defendants may be able to provide enough collateral to secure a bond,
they may have trouble finding a bondsperson willing to put in the
time, effort and risk for such little profit.171
Shaun McManus is fortunate that his case came before the
Court of Appeals when it did, because less than a month later the
State Senate passed legislation that gave judges more factors to consider when setting bail.172 The legislation, known as “Jilly’s Law,”
would allow the judge to consider the safety of the victim, severity of
offense and severity of injuries suffered through the offense. 173 The
bill was sent to the Assembly on April 18, 2012, after the Senate approved it. Had “Jilly’s Law” been passed before McManus was arraigned, the judge could have considered the safety of the victim he
threatened and the severity of his offense.174 The judge could also
have considered the fact that McManus previously violated a court
order of protection.175 Section four, subdivision five of the proposed
law gives the court the discretion to deny bail if there is substantial
evidence to support the charge and clear and convincing evidence
that the defendant is a danger to the victim, community, or themselves.176 Under these considerations, McManus could have been detained and the determination of cash-only bail would still be undetermined in the New York courts.
The decision in McManus v. Horn, the possibility of “Jilly’s
Law” becoming effective, and the overcrowding of New York state
and county prisons177 are all indicators that the state’s bail scheme is
becoming an issue that needs to be addressed sooner rather than later.
The Court in McManus believes its decision will help alleviate some
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of the issues in the scheme by providing flexible bail alternatives.178
However, setting alternative forms of bail in certain circumstances
can be just as restricting as setting a single form of bail.179 What the
McManus decision leaves for future legislation and judicial proceedings to deal with is whether a choice between two unattainable bail
forms is really a choice at all.
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